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I 
THERE IS VERY LITTLE DISPUTE OVER THE PACTS 
GERMANE TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL 
Respondents suggest that the entire appeal should be dismissed 
because of Plaintiffs' failure to refer to the record with respect 
to the statement of facts contained within Appellants' Opening 
Brief. Plaintiffs' counsel apologizes to the Court for the 
oversight in not citing the specific record on appeal with respect 
to the Statement of Facts contained therein. However, there is 
very little dispute over the facts germane to the issues presented 
by this appeal and Plaintiffs are willing to simply accept the 
Statement of Facts as presented by the Respondents' Brief with the 
exception of paragraph 5 on page 5 of the Respondents' Brief. The 
Bouchers observed their son in a comatose state at the hospital 
after being advised by a member of the hospital staff that 
something was terribly wrong with Danny. Further, the Bouchers 
observed their child awaken from the coma as a severely brain 
damaged quadriplegic. (Record (R.) at 219). 
Further, Appellants are not requesting any additional relief 
by way of this appeal that has not been previously presented to the 
trial court. Specifically, the request for relief to amend the 
complaint to more fully state a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress based on the "direct victim" 
status of the appellants was raised before the trial court. (R. 
231) (Reporter's Hearing Transcript of Friday, May 4, 1990, page 
19, line 16 - page 20, line 9). It is a common practice for courts 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) 6 and the similar 
1 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) 6 to grant a Motion to 
Dismiss With Leave to Amend. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
15(b); Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1452 (Utah 1986); McGavin v. 
Preferred Ins. Exch., 7 Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958); Griffen 
v. Lack, 286 F.2d 514, (9th Circ. 1961). 
II 
THE CLAIM OF TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER FOR 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
IS GENUINE AND SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS BEING 
LEGITIMATELY PLED 
A. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR 
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS WHICH ARE FORESEEABLE AND GENUINE BUT DO NOT FIT 
SNUGLY UNDER THE STANDARD OF THE RESTATEMENT "ZONE OF DANGER" 
TEST. 
For purposes of determining whether or not Torla and James 
Boucher are entitled to recover emotional distress damages as a 
result of the medical negligence of defendants under a purely 
bystander theory Plaintiffs concede that if this Court applies a 
strict construction of the Restatement "zone of dcinger" test the 
trial court herein correctly dismissed the Boucher's claim. 
However, this case demonstrates the patent unfairness of applying 
such an inflexible, mechanistic test to every circumstance 
involving serious foreseeable emotional harm to one other than the 
victim of a physical impact. Commentators and jurists including 
Justice Durham of this Court are critical of the "2sone of danger" 
test as too rigid. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, Utah (1988) 
Justice Durham refers to several law review articles critical of 
2 
the "zone of danger" standard. Johnson Id. at 783 and 784. For 
example, in one article appearing in the Indiana Law Review/ "The 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of 
Various Approaches to the Tort In Light of Ochoa v. Superior 
Court," 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986), the author states: 
Despite its positive aspects, the rule 
(zone of danger) has many draw backs. The 
zone of danger rule is considered to be an 
unnecessary, narrow, rigid, and unjust 
limitation on the class of persons who may 
recover. For example, the rule denies 
recovery to a mother who sees her child hit by 
a car from a distance, yet allows recovery to 
a mother who stood a few feet closer to the 
accident. Both mothers would foreseeably 
suffer the same emotional injury. In this 
respect, the rule fails to protect worthy 
interests. Thus, limiting recovery by 
physical distance is as arbitrary as requiring 
a physical impact. 
Finally, the courts that have abandoned 
the zone of danger approach in favor of more 
expansive approaches have not encountered an 
increased number of fraudulent claims or a 
flood of litigation. 
Id. at 814. (Parenthetical added.) 
More importantly, Justice Zimmermann, with the concurrence of 
the majority in Johnson makes his reluctance to measure each and 
every case of negligent infliction of emotional distress by the 
rigid "zone of danger" test known: 
I recognize that some of the limitations 
inherent in the 'zone of danger1 rule of 
section 313 are hard to justify on a purely 
theoretical basis. Indeed, I have serious 
concerns about the theoretical rationality of 
any limits that can be imposed on liability 
XA copy of the Indiana Law Review article is attached as 
Addendum "A" hereto. 
3 
for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. (Citations omitted.) 
Johnson. Id. at 814. 
Further, Justice Zimmermann stated, with the concurrence of 
the entire Court: 
At some future date, we may determine that 
there is merit in some of the other approaches 
surveyed in Justice Durham's opinion. However, 
until we have had experience with the cause of 
action, I conclude that it is best to take the 
more conservative approach and adopt the 
Restatement rule as written. 
Johnson, Id. at 814. 
Plaintiffs suggest that this case presents an opportunity for 
this Court to take a cautious step forward toward achieving a more 
just result as the circumstances herein present than would the 
"zone of danger" test permit. 
The object here is to fashion an approach that will redress 
the emotional harm done to Danny Boucher's parents and others 
similarly situated, but limited enough in scope to avoid opening 
the flood gates to exaggerated claims. Many jurisdictions have 
grappled with this dilemma, some attempting to distinguish the 
"bystander" from the "direct victims," others making no 
distinction. 
The confusion is best exemplified by the seemingly 
contradictory decisions which emanate from the State* of California 
during what is commonly referred to as the "post Dillon era." The 
California Second District Court of Appeals in Schwarz v. Regents 
of University of California. 276 Cal.Rptr. 470 (Dec. 1990) a case 
cited by defendants, recounts this confusion at page 475. 
4 
California Supreme Court Justice Eagleson in Thing v. 
La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, (1989), 771 P.2d 814 (Apr. 1989) after 
conducting an exhaustive review of case law and commentary on the 
tort, has fashioned a standard for determining when a plaintiff has 
a right of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
which although somewhat arbitrary, provides a fair balance and 
reasonable limit to such claims. 
We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may 
recover damages for emotional distress caused 
by observing the negligently inflicted injury 
of a third person if, but only if, said 
plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the 
injury victims; (2) is present at the scene of 
the injury producing event at the time it 
occurs and is then aware that it is causing 
injury to the victim; and (3) as a result 
suffers serious emotional distress - a 
reaction beyond that which would be 
anticipated in a disinterested witness and 
which is not an abnormal response to the 
circumstances. 
Id. at 830. 
James and Torla Boucher suggest that this Court adopt the 
Thing standard when measuring "bystander liability" for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Such a standard would allow 
recovery in this case without opening the flood gates to spurious 
claims. Since the California Supreme Court has had vast experience 
with the development of the tort and the manner in which it has 
been dealt with by the lower Courts, logically this would be an 
appropriate Court to turn to for guidance. 
The Boucher's claim fits clearly within the limits of the 
Thing test. As parents, they are closely related to Danny, the 
victim. They have suffered distress beyond that expected of a 
"disinterested person" and which is certainly not abnormal or 
unexpected under the circumstances. Finally, just as the mother in 
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 159, they were present at the 
scene, while Danny was in coma, and were painfully aware that the 
medical care being provided was causing Danny injury. 
The requirement of a contemporaneous perception of the 
incident has been liberally construed. City of Austin v. Davis, 
(Tex.App. 1985), 639 S.W.2d 31, 33 (a father "intensely involved in 
search and subsequent discovery of his son" at the bottom of an air 
shaft, satisfied the contemporaneous observation requirements of 
the "bystander" doctrine); Champion v. Gray, (Fla. 1985) 478 So.2d 
17 (mother seeing daughter's body at the scene of an accident, 
collapsed and died on the spot satisfied the contemporaneous 
observation requirement); Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkin, 
(Alaska 1986) 727 P.2d 1038, (parents arrived on the scene shortly 
after an accident and observed their dying daughter being dragged 
by the hair from a wrecked auto, held to satisfy the 
contemporaneous observation requirement). 
The circumstances of this case are very similar to the facts 
of Ochoa, supra, previously cited in the Boucher's opening brief at 
page 29 and reviewed at length by the California Supreme Court in 
Thing. In Ochoa, a 13-year-old boy, while in the custody of the 
Santa Clara Juvenile Hall, became ill. His mother visited him on 
two occasions and was very distressed at what she perceived to be 
inadequate medical attention. Her son later died of complications 
associated with pneumonia. The California Supreme Court, held that 
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negligence resulting in emotional distress to 
one who is not physically injured by the 
defendant's conduct, Thing v. La Chusa. supra. 
48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 
does not expressly overrule any prior Supreme 
Court case and does not appear to do so 
implicitly• While the opinion criticizes 
Krouse v. Graham, supra., 19 Cal.3d 59, 137 
Cal.Rptr, 863, 562 P. 2d 1022 (Thing, supra. 48 
Cal.3d at p. 656, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 
814)), the plaintiff in Krouse would meet the 
requirements set forth in Thing. Similarly, 
the opinion rejects a particular dictum in 
Ochoa v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.3d 159, 
216 Cal.Rptr. 661, 703 P.2d 1 (Thing, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at pp. 660, 668, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 
771 P.2d 814), but again, the plaintiff in 
Ochoa would men I; the requirements now 
enunciated. 
•• ' Schwarz, Id at 476 ' • ^ 
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7 
is required to recognize that defendant's conduct somehow caused 
Danny's injuries• 
Therefore, the Bouchers urge this Court to adopt the Thing 
standard from a jurisdiction that has already experienced the 
"kinks" in the tort. The "zone of danger" test is an unfair and 
antiquated standard, that, more often than not, will lead to an 
unjust result. 
B. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE BOUCHERS OUGHT TO BE ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES 
BASED ON AN ENLIGHTENED "BYSTANDER19 THEORY OF RECOVERY, THE 
BOUCHERS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER SUCH DAMAGES PREMISED ON A 
"DIRECT VICTIM" LIABILITY BASIS, 
As previously argued at length in the opening brief, the 
Bouchers are entitled to recover as "direct victims" under a 
contract or foreseeability theory. In response, defendants rely 
upon Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic Inc., 48 
Cal. 583, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) and Schwarz v. Regents of the 
University of California, 276 Cal.Rptr. 470 (Cal.App.2d Dist. 1990) 
to suggest to this Court that the Bouchers are not "direct victims" 
of the medical negligence performed upon their son Danny. 
No one disputes the findings of the Court in Marlene F. The 
mothers were patients as well as "direct victims" of the breach of 
the psychotherapist-patient relationship. In Marlcme F. however, 
the Court did not exclude from the "direct victim" status all who 
were not patients of the physician and/or the health care 
providers. 
8 
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Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital. 27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 
167 Cal.Rptr. 831 (1980), Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal.App.3d 
600, 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 (1984), Newton v. Kaiser Hospital. 184 
Cal.App.3d 386, 228 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1986), Accounts Adi ustment 
Bureau v. Cooperman, 158 Cal.App.3d 844, 204 Cal.Rptr. 881 (1984), 
Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal.App.3d 108, 181 Cal.Rptr. 12 (1982), 
Ouesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal.App.3d 596, 
Cal. Rptr. (Aug. 1989), all of which have been cited in 
Appellants' Opening Brief under Section VII (A). 
Ill 
THE RIGHT OF THE BOUCHERS TO RECOVER FOR 
LOSS OF FILIAL CONSORTIUM RESULTING FROM 
SEVERE INJURIES TO THEIR ADULT CHILD IS 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH COMMON LAW 
Defendants suggest that the loss of filial consortium is a 
non-recoverable damage in the State of Utah and rely principally 
upon the case of Hackford v. Utah Power and Light Company, 740 P.2d 
1281 (Utah 1987). As plaintiffs have argued repeatedly, reliance 
on the Hackford decision is totally and completely misplaced in 
attempting to determine the right of the parents in this case to 
recover for loss of filial consortium as a result of severe and 
permanent injuries to their adult child. 
The issue presented in Hackford was whether or not the Married 
Woman's Act, Rev. Stat, of Utah 1989, Section 1198 - 1207, now 
found at Utah Code Ann. . Section 30-2-1 - 10 (1984) , abolished the 
common law right of a husband to recover loss of consortium for 
death or injury to his wife. Justice Zimmermann, after reviewing 
previous interpretations of the Married Woman's Act found in Black 
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*ontrary, Utah Code Ann, t section 78-11 * 6, states in 
"[A] parent or guardian may maintain an action 
for the death or injury of a minor child when 
such injury or death is caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another " 
•^ri^rt^ -~terpret t h i s S t a tu t e hi imparl liiat a parent may 
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the damages su Cfered by t he parent as a resu 11 of I :i>e *rongfuI 
vtwciw*"* or injury oi Lhe child. See Utah Law Review Vol. 19 79 N c 1 
p. 77, footnote 2, "Decedent's Heirs Under the Utah Wrongful Death 
Act." 2 
The only question presented by this case which has not 
apparently been answered by the Utah Courts and/or Legislature is 
whether or not the parents of a severely injured adult child may 
recover for loss of filial consortium. 
Justice Durham, in her dissenting opinion in Hackford points 
out that Utah has long permitted parental recovery for the loss of 
society, love, and companionship in cases where the claim arises 
out of wrongful death citing Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 
(Utah 1982), Hackford Id. at 1293. The Utah Supreme Court has 
reiterated this view taken in Jones in Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 
Utah 146, 159, 160 (1946). Further, in Beaman v. Mining Co., 23 
Utah 139 (1900) the Utah Supreme Court adopted the view that 
recovery for loss of filial consortium was not limited to the age 
of minority but such right extends beyond the age of minority. 
Plaintiffs have not uncovered a case in the State of Utah 
wherein the Courts have addressed the specific issue presented 
herein, that is, the right of the parents to recover for loss of 
filial consortium for severe injuries sustained by their adult 
child. However, Justice Durham in her dissenting opinion to the 
Hackford decision suggests, at least implicitly, that there should 
be no distinction between a deceased versus incapacitated or 
severely injured member of the consortium relationship. Hackford. 
Id. at 1293 - 1294. Interestingly enough, Justice Durham cites an 
2A copy is attached as Addendum "B." 
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In Frank. the Arizona Supreme Court, En Banc, agreed with 
Reben and concluded that: 
Often death is separated from severe injury by 
mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to 
distinguish between the two when the quality 
of consortium is negatively affected by both. 
Frank, Id. at 957. 
Quoting from an article in the Arizona State Journal, "The 
Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting From 
the Negligent Injury to a Child: A Proposal for Arizona," 1980 
Ariz. St.L.J. 909, 923 the Court in Frank states: 
'It is easy to see that the loss of a child 
through his death takes from his parents the 
society and companionship that is the essence 
of the lost relationship. But consider the 
magnitude of the loss of society and 
companionship that occurs when a normal 
[child] is suddenly reduced to a blind, nearly 
deaf, partially paralyzed child with a mental 
age of three. The parental expectations for 
the continuation of the family relationship 
are the same in either case. That the parents 
still have their son to love and care for is a 
factor to consider in determining the extent 
of their loss, but does not negate the loss. 
They have sustained a genuine loss in the 
nature of the society and companionship they 
can anticipate receiving from their son as a 
consequence of his injuries.• 
Finally, the Frank Court, after conducting an exhaustive study 
of the origin and/or right of loss of consortium and its heritage 
concluded that 
Therefore, to suggest as a matter of law that 
compensable consortium begins at birth and 
ends at age eighteen is illogical and 
inconsistent with common sense and experience. 
Human relationships cannot and should not be 
14 
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It is irrelevant that parents are not entitled 
to the services of their adult children; they 
continue to enjoy a legitimate and protectible 
expectation of consortium beyond majority 
arising from the very bonds of the family 
relationship. Surely nature recoils from the 
suggestion that the society, companionship and 
love which compose filial consortium 
automatically fade upon emancipation. 
Frank, J J 
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For the foregoing reasons Appellants respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the dismissal of the trial Court. 
LAW OFFICES OF IRWIN M. ZALKIN 
DATED . 4/si hi Byn 
Irwin M. zalkin 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM "7\ 
The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical 
Analysis of Various Approaches to the Tort in Light of 
Ochoa v. Superior Court 
L INTRODUCTION 
The negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort that has evolved 
rapidly since 1968.! This rapid evolution has caused courts to analyze 
and apply the concept in vastly different ways. Four general approaches 
have emerged out of the chaos — the impact rule, the zone of danger 
approach, the pure foreseeability approach, and the Dillon test. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each of these views have been the 
subject of much debate.2 To date, the "best" approach appears to be 
an unanswered question. 
California broke new ground in this area of the law. In Dillon v. 
LeggS the California Supreme Court created a three-prong foreseeability 
test as a guideline for determining a defendant's duty to a bystander 
who witnesses the death or injury of a loved one.4 Although the Dillon 
approach has been generally well received, it has also provoked some 
valid criticisms.5 
•W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
or TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter ated as PROSSER & KEETON). The negligent 
infliction of emotional distress has been defined as "a tort against the integrity of the 
family unit." Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983). "The existence 
of a marital or intimate familial relationship is the nucleus of the personal interest to be 
protected." Id. 
2See, e.g., Maragos, Negiigent Infliction of Emotional Distress — Mixed Signals?, 
% WEST ST. U.L. REV. 139 (1981); Nolan and Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: Coherence Emerging From Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1981-82); Pearson, 
Lability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm — A Comment on the 
Nature of Arbttrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); Note, Molien v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional 
Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1981-82); Comment, Bystander Recovery for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an Optimal Balance, 67 IOWA L. 
REV. 333 (1981-82); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical 
Impact or Subsequent Physical Injury, 47 Mo. L. REV. 124 (1982); Comment, Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in New Jersey: Compensating the Foreseeable Plaintiff, 
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 796 (1979); Note, Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress 
Permitted to Mother Who Witnessed the Violent Death of Her Child Even Though the 
Mother was Outside Zone of Danger, 25 Vnx. L. REV. 195 (1979-80). 
*8 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
'Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
'See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 665, 338 A.2d 524, 535 (1975) 
(Joslin, J., dissenting) {Dillon approach provides no rational way to limit liability); see 
cbo infra text accompanying notes 126-55. 
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Recently, the California Supreme Court was given an opportunity 
to clarify the application of the Dillon test in a factually distinguishable 
case and thereby eliminate the criticisms of Dillon. In Ochoa v. Superior 
Court * the court declined this opportunity. The Ochoa court ignored 
the unsettled debate as to the best approach in mental distress cases 
and the conflict in its own case law. It limited its holding to the facts 
of the case and added a few variations to prior case law.7 The result 
was the addition of another conflicting mental distress case to a collection 
of discordant case law. 
This Note will survey the benefits and criticisms of each of the four 
approaches to the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Next, 
this Note will review the cases that have followed Dillon and elucidate 
the inconsistencies in the case law. The Ochoa case will also be analyzed 
with respect to its inconsistencies with prior Dillon progeny, its internal 
reasoning, and its effect upon future mental distress law in Dillon 
jurisdictions and in jurisdictions that use other approaches. Finally, this 
Note will propose a more just and equitable solution: a flexible and 
relaxed standard for liability coupled with an increased burden of proof 
for recovery. 
II. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS TO COMMON PROBLEMS 
The courts have used four vastly different approaches to the tort 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress: the impact rule, the zone 
of danger rule, the pure foreseeability approach, and the Dillon fore-
seeability test. Each approach merits a discussion of its advantages and 
disadvantages. 
A. The Impact Rule 
The impact rule was the original, and most limiting, of all the mental 
distress approaches.8 The jurisdictions that follow this rule allow no 
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress unless the 
plaintiff suffers a contemporaneous physical impact.9 Accordingly, a 
bystander who witnesses an injury to another cannot recover for his 
mental distress absent a physical impact.10 
*39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). 
7d. at 170-72, 703 P.2d at 8-9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69. 
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at § 54. 
*£.g., Estate of Harper 9 . Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1979); Hariccom v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 104 111. App. 3d 780, 
433 N.E.2d 291 (1982); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walters, 466 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1984); Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 610 P.2d 739 (1980). 
"»£.£., Harkcom. 104 ill. App. 3d 780, 433 N.E.2d 291. 
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Several rationales have been advanced in favor of the impact rule. 
First and foremost, the physical impact rule allows certainty of liability.M 
The defendant may be found liable for the plaintiffs mental distress 
only if he caused a physical impact upon the plaintiff. Because the 
impact rule provides simplicity and consistency to the question of liability, 
some courts have continued to use it, even though its other benefits are 
doubtful.12 
The impact rule satisfied the courts' general distrust of emotional 
distress claims.13 First, the courts thought the impact rule prevented 
speculative damage awards.14 Limiting liability to cases involving impact 
was thought to limit recovery to situations where the emotional injury 
could be substantiated.15 Actual mental injury was thought to be more 
probable when the plaintiff suffered a physical impact than when he 
did not.16 Therefore, the impact rule validated emotional distress awards 
by restricting them to cases where actual mental injury was most probable. 
Even if medical science could establish mental injury to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, advocates of the impact rule argued that causation 
of those damages would be difficult to prove absent impact.17 Even if 
the mental damage could be established, there was no proof that the 
defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the injury in question.18 
Thus, physical impact was required to prove causation.19 
By substantiating the injury and causation elements of the cause of 
action, the impact rule reduced the potential for fraudulent claims.20 
The argument was that if one could not establish mental injury or 
causation to any degree of medical certainty, then the potential for 
fraudulent claims would increase.21 Thus, as impact substantiated both 
mental injury and causation, it decreased the opportunity for fraud. 
Moreover, the impact rule prevented potential theoretical problems. 
First, the courts were fearful of a flood of litigation over trivial claims 
if the impact restriction were removed.22 A physical impact limited 
11
 See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 363-64. 
'-The impact rule originally provided causation and proof of damages when medical 
science could not. Today, the medical field has made great advances in the areas of 
psychiatry and mental illness, and such proof is no longer needed. Towns v. Anderson, 
195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978). 
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 363. 
"Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163. 
"Id. 
"Id. 
,7See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). 
"See id. 
"See id. 
*See Towns, 195 Colo, at 519. 579 P.2d at 1164, 
"See id. 
-See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 162, 404 A.2d at 680. 
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litigation to cases deserving recovery.23 Second, once the impact restriction 
was removed, liability would be greatly extended and difficult to limit 
at any stage.24 The courts feared the lack of a rational basis for limiting 
liability.25 Thus, absent the impact requirement, it was thought that the 
courts would eventually be forced to recognize a cause of action for 
mental distress under any circumstances.26 Finally, the elimination of the 
impact rule was thought to impose a new duty upon the defendant.27 
A new duty created a new cause of action.2* Therefore, judicial con-
servatism favored the retention of the impact rule.29 
Although the impact rule was initially a majority approach to the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, it has fallen into disfavor in 
recent years.30 Many of the rule's rationales have become outmoded. 
The most important reason for the decline of the impact rule was 
the advance in medical science in the area of mental ailments.31 Psychiatry 
can now prove injury and causation to some degree.32 Thus, the potential 
for fraudulent claims, absent impact, is reduced.33 
Furthermore, the flood of litigation argument has been rejected as 
a valid reason for requiring physical impact.34 A court's caseload is, by 
itself, an unacceptable reason for denying recovery where it is deserved.33 
In fact, those courts that have abandoned the impact rule have not 
encountered an increase in this type of litigation.36 
Finally, the impact rule has been criticized as arbitrary, capricious, 
and inequitable.37 Requiring impact denies deserving plaintiffs a recovery 
for a sometimes debilitating injury.3* An emotional injury can be as 
devasting to one's health as a physical injury39 and therefore also deserves 
"PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I, § 54 at 363. 
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554. 
558 (1969). 
*Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. 
*/rf. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. 
*See. e.*., Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
1, at § 54. 
"See, e.g., Culbcrt v. Sampson's Supermarket. 444 A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982). 
"See. e.*., Sinn, 436 Pa. at 158, 404 A.2d at 678. 
"Id. 
uId. at 162-63, 404 A.2d at 680-81. 
"Id. at 163, 404 A.2d at 681; see also Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental 
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939). 
"See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 162 n.12, 404 A.2d at 680 n.12. 
"£.*., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
MSee Estate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
"See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babincau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (mother 
died from shock of witnessing daughter being hit by car). 
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compensation. The rule is arbitrary because it has been used as a legal 
fiction.40 For example, smoke, dust, trivial burns, or jolts may supply 
the impact necessary for recovery.41 Because claims of pain and suffering 
in physical injury suits may be fraudulent or exaggerated, the argument 
that physical impact in emotional distress suits reduces fraud is un-
founded.42 These serious criticisms of the impact rule have led many 
courts to abandon it in favor of one of the newer approaches. 
B. Zone of Danger 
The zone of danger rule is succinctly stated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. Section 313 provides: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to 
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness 
or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an un-
reasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by 
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and 
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the 
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily 
harm. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to 
illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional 
distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, 
unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.41 
In other words, the actor will not be found liable for a bystander's 
emotional distress unless: (1) the actor's conduct was negligent; (2) it 
was foreseeable that the bystander would suffer distress; and (3) the 
bystander was within the zone of danger created by the defendant's 
conduct.44 Many states follow this zone of danger approach.45 
The zone of danger rule has several advantages. First, the zone of 
danger determination is objective and can be readily and consistently 
•PHOSSE* & KEETON, supra note I, $ 54 at 363. 
"Id. at 363-64. 
*See. e.g., Schuitz v. Barberton Glass Co.. 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 
(1983). 
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 313 (1965) (emphasis added). 
~ld. 
"Eg., Keck v. Jackson. 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (en banc); Towns, 195 
Colo. 517. 579 P.2d 1163; Scadier v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); Vaiilancourt 
v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc.. 139 Vt. 131. 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Waul* v. 
Warrington. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
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applied.46 The zone of danger rule permits a simple determination of 
which persons may recover.47 
Second, the defendant's liability is based to some degree upon his 
reasonable expectations of what injury could result from his conduct.4* 
If the defendant injures a small child, he should expect a parent to be 
nearby and to suffer severe mental distress from realization of the child's 
injury.49 Although this rationale does not apply in every situation, it 
does give some legitimacy to the rule.50 
Finally, the courts have used some of the same rationales for the 
zone of danger rule that supported the impact rule. The zone of danger 
approach limits liability by limiting the class of persons who may re-
cover.31 Thus, the rule arguably prevents a flood of litigation. 
Despite its positive aspects, the rule has many drawbacks. The zone 
of danger rule is considered to be an unnecessary, narrow, rigid, and 
unjust limitation on the class of persons who may recover.52 For example, 
the rule denies recovery to a mother who sees her child hit by a car 
from a distance, yet allows recovery to a mother who stood a few feet 
closer to the accident.53 Both mothers would foreseeably suffer the same 
emotional injury. In this respect, the rule fails to protect worthy in-
terests.34 Thus, limiting recovery by physical distance is as arbitrary as 
requiring a physical impact.55 
Finally, the courts that have abandoned the zone of danger approach 
in favor of more expansive approaches have not encountered an increased 
number of fraudulent claims56 or a flood of litigation.57 
C. Pure Foreseeability 
Two jurisdictions have adopted a new approach to the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Both Ohio58 and Hawaii59 have expanded 
"E.g., Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554. 
"Dziokonski, 375 Mass. at 564, 380 N.E.2d at 1300. 
"See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 366. 
"Id. 
"•For example, a wife who witnesses a husband's injury could reasonably suffer 
severe mental distress yet not be a foreseeable witness to the defendant. 
"See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982). 
'•Id. 
"In Dillon, the trial court dismissed the mother's claim based on the zone of danger 
rule because the mother witnessed the accident from a few feet further than the victim's 
lister, who was allowed to proceed with her daim. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d 
at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
"£.*., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979). 
MSw#i, 486 Pa. at 157, 404 A.2d at 677-78. 
"See id. at 162 n.12, 404 A.2d at 680 n.12. 
%
'See id. 
*Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983). 
^Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). 
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liability on a "pure foreseeability" basis. Where serious emotional distress 
to a plaintiff-bystander is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant's negligent act, liability is imposed based on the application 
of general tort principles.60 
Many of the previous restrictions upon liability are absent in the 
"pure foreseeability'' approach. The plaintiffs recovery is not limited 
to situations where the defendant actually causes injury or death to 
another.61 The defendant's act need not result in physical harm to the 
victim.62 In addition, the plaintiff has a cause of action for emotional 
distress for negligent damage to his personal63 or real64 property. More-
over, if the bystander's emotional distress is serious, physical harm is 
not required.65 Without the requirements of actual physical harm to a 
third person or resulting physical injury to the plaintiff from his distress, 
the pure foreseeability approach allows recovery in a broad range of 
circumstances.66 
The pure foreseeability approach has one additional advantage over 
previous approaches. It defines the tort in a manner that conforms to 
other aspects of negligence law67 by basing duty on foreseeability prin-
ciples.6* In addition, the plaintiff must prove a breach of duty, causation, 
and harm.69 The only limitation imposed upon recovery, other than the 
usual negligence constraints, is that the distress must be serious,70 which 
is determined objectively.71 Once the objective threshold is met, the 
plaintiff may recover for any distress actually suffered.72 
The scope of recoverable damages also conforms to other aspects 
of tort law.73 If the defendant had caused a bodily injury to the plaintiff, 
he would be liable for pain and suffering.74 Therefore, if he causes a 
"Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156. 174. 472 P.2d 509. 520 (1970). 
"Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 80. 451 N.E.2d at 767. 
"Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557. 632 P.2d 1066 (1981) 
(recovery for mental distress due to death of family dog). 
"Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156. 472 P.2d 509 (recovery for mental distress due to 
negligent damage to house). 
"See id. Emotional distress is serious when "a reasonable man, normally constituted, 
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances 
of the case." Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. 
*See. e.g., Campbell, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (distress from death of dog); 
Leong, 55 Hawaii at 398. 520 P.2d at 758 (distress from seeing step-grandmother killed); 
Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (distress from damage to home). 
"See, e.g., Leong, 55 Hawaii at 408, 520 P.2d at 764-65. 
"Id. 
-Id at 407. 520 P.2d at 764. 
"Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520. 
uSee supra note 65. 
^In tort law, the plaintiff may recover for any injury actually suffered under the 
"Eggshell Skull" theory. PKOSSE* & KEETOM, supra note !, § 43 at 291-92. 
nSee Leong, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758. 
uSee Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 75. 451 N.E.2d at 763. 
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mental injury, regardless of the source of the distress, he should be | 
liable for the pain and suffering or distress that such an injury involves.73 z: 
Despite these advantages, the courts have struggled to utilize the ^ 
pure foreseeability theory without extending liability beyond what would 1 
be expected.76 The greatest difficulty with the pure foreseeability approach 
is the determination of the defendant's duty. While all courts that have 
used this approach agree that foreseeability is the basis of duty, the 
courts are in conflict as to what must be foreseeable to impose that 
duty. 
One view is that duty is based upon a foreseeable injury.77 The 
plaintiff may recover if his mental distress was reasonably foreseeable.71 
This approach is too broad. Many of life's events cause reasonably 
foreseeable mental distress. For example, rejection of a child by his 
social peers may cause foreseeable distress to the child's parents. Likewise, 
a car accident that killed a distant relative to the plaintiff could fore-
seeably cause mental distress. Thus, this broad test of foreseeable injury 
imposes a duty in situations that the law may not deem worthy of 
compensation. 
Another approach to duty used under the pure foreseeability rule 
is the foreseeable plaintiff.79 The defendant's duty is limited to the risks 
of his negligent act.80 The defendant owes a duty only to those plaintiffs 
who are foreseeably endangered by the risks that made the conduct 
unreasonably dangerous.81 Despite this limitation upon duty, the courts 
have struggled with liability beyond that which the defendant could or 
should expect.82 For example, the defendant could be liable for emotional 
distress of the victim's entire family because they are foreseeable plain-
tiffs.83 Thus, despite the objective that emotional distress should conform 
to other aspects of negligence law, the courts began to impose arbitrary 
restrictions, such as distance, upon duty.84 Limiting liability by geo-
graphical distance between the event and the plaintiff creates the same 
problems as the zone of danger approach.83 
77<*. at 77, 451 N.E.2d at 765. 
*See, e.g.. Kclley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975) 
(plaintiff must be located within reasonable distance from accident in "pure foreseeability" 
cases even though physical distance should not alone bar recovery). 
"See Leong, 55 Hawaii at 408, 520 P.2d at 764-65. 
"See Rodngues, 52 Hawaii at 174, 472 P.2d at 521. 
mId. 
"Id. 
cSee Kelley, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673. 
"Before Keliey was decided, any "foreseeable" plaintiff could have recovered. See 
Rodngues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509. 
"See Keliey, 56 Hawaii at 209, 532 P.2d at 676, 
"See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
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The extension of duty to mental distress caused by injury to property 
has also been a source of controversy. Recovery for emotional distress 
caused by property loss promotes materialism.86 Furthermore, a plaintiff 
who is economically compensated for property loss should not objectively 
suffer severe emotional distress. In other words, the defendant would 
not expect that an economically compensated loss would cause severe 
emotional distress. While there may be some basis for emotional distress 
when the defendant destroys unique and irreplaceable property, the courts 
have not specifically limited duty in this manner.87 Thus, under this 
approach, a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress resulting from 
damage to his car, boat, or clothes. Although an individual could 
foreseeably develop an emotional attachment to these items, the defendant 
has no reasonable expectation of liability. Until these theoretical conflicts 
are settled, most courts will probably not follow the pure foreseeability 
approach. 
D. The Dillon Approach 
The final approach to the negligent infliction of emotional distress 
is that espoused in Dillon v. Legg.** Dillon was a classic example of 
the problems associated with the zone of danger approach. A child was 
negligently struck and killed by the defendant automobile driver. Both 
the victim's mother and sister suffered severe emotional distress from 
observing the accident. Because the sister had been standing a few feet 
closer to the victim, she was within the zone of danger, while the mother 
was not. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the mother's claim. On 
review of the dismissal, the California Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff should recover if the defendant should foresee fright or shock 
severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person "normally con-
stituted."89 
The California court carefully delineated guidelines for the deter-
mination of the defendant's duty. These guidelines are: 1) "Whether 
plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with 
one who was a distance away from it;"90 2) "Whether the shock resulted 
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and 
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning 
of the accident from others after its occurrence;"9* and 3) "Whether 
"*£$.. Rodngues, 52 Hawaii at 178-79, 472 P.2d at 522-23 (Levinson, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
"See, e.g., id. Rodriguez dealt with the negligent flooding of plaintiffs home. There 
is no indication that such a decision would not be extended to other property items. 
-68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 CaJ. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
"Id, at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 C3l. Rptr. at 80. 
m!d. 
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plaintiff and the victim [are] closely related, as contrasted with an absence 
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship."92 
The court rioted that while the defendant's duty could not be prede-
termined in every instance, that duty should be based upon the degree 
of foreseeability;93 the case should be governed by general rules of tort 
law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and fore-
seeability.94 
Many courts follow the Dillon approach.95 Dillon discards arbitrary 
limitations on the defendant's duty in favor of a more rational fore-
seeability approach.96 The imposition of duty by the foreseeability factors 
set forth in Dillon comports with public policy.97 Public policy demands 
a remedy for one who suffers a wrong.98 Courts have considered that 
this method does not drastically increase the defendant's burden, as the 
departure from prior law is only in the scope of recognizable damages 
flowing from the negligent conduct.99 
The Dillon foreseeability test is a middle-of-the-road approach. It 
recognizes the benefits of using foreseeability to determine duty, yet 
limits the duty where pure foreseeability cannot. It balances the need 
for flexible plaintiff recovery against the hardship of unlimited liability 
for the defendant. The Dillon standard incorporates the foreseeable 
plaintiff test with the foreseeable mental injury test.'00 Despite the the-
oretical soundness of such an approach, however, California courts have 
struggled with its application in non-conventional situations. 
III. THE CALIFORNIA CONFLICT — THE AFTERMATH 
OF Dillon AND THE Ochoa DECISION 
Dillon became the basis for an entire line of mental distress cases. 
These cases culminated in the recent case of Ochoa v. Superior Court.m 
"id. 
"Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. 
mId. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84. 
"See, e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164. 326 A.2d 129 
(1973); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 
Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Daokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 
(1978); Miller v. Cook, 87 Mich. App. 6, 273 N.W.2d 567 (1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 
N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); 
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 
404 A.2d 672 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1982). 
«\See. e.g., Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437. 
"See Sinn, 486 Pa. at 161-67, 404 A.2d at 680-83. 
mSee id. at 167, 404 A.2d at 683. 
"Id. 
"«See Di/lon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. 
'"•39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1. 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). 
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In Ochoa, the court changed Dillon appreciably without answering the 
questions raised by the Dillon progeny or by the debate as to which 
mental distress theory is best. 
A. The Ochoa Decision 
The Ochoa case dealt with the death of a thirteen-year-old boy. The 
child was being held in a juvenile hall when he became severely ill with 
bilateral pneumonia. The defendant doctor misdiagnosed the child as 
having influenza. He visited the child twice in two days, despite repeated 
communications by the plaintiff-mother that further treatment was needed. 
Mrs. Ochoa visited her son and found him extremely ill and in severe 
pain. Despite Mrs. Ochoa's pleas, no x-rays, blood tests, or urine tests 
were performed. She was denied the opportunity to take her child to 
their family physician. Mrs. Ochoa visited her son several times, but 
was not present when he died. Her husband, also a plaintiff in the suit, 
visited the child once while he was ill. The child died three days after 
the onset of his illness. 
In addition to suing on several other grounds, Mr. and Mrs. Ochoa 
sued for their mental distress caused by the doctor's negligence in 
mistreating their son. The trial court dismissed their claim for negligent 
infliction of mental distress.'02 The plaintiffs then sought a writ of 
mandate to compel the trial court to reinstate several causes of action, 
including their mental distress claim.103 The California Supreme Court 
held that both plaintiffs had a cause of action for the distress they 
suffered as a result of their observation of the defendant's conduct, the 
child's injury, and their contemporaneous awareness that the defendant's 
conduct or lack thereof was causing injury to the child.104 Furthermore, 
the court held that the injury to the victim need not be caused by a 
sudden occurrence.105 Requiring the injury to be sudden arbitrarily limits 
liability when the shock to the plaintiff is highly foreseeable, especially 
when the shock flows from an abnormal event.106 
B. The Dillon Progeny: Cases and Conflicts 
To understand the import of Ochoa, the Dillon progeny must be 
analyzed. In the decisions following Dillon, three main areas of conflict 
have arisen. The first area of controversy involves the definition of 
"contemporaneous" in the second portion of the Dillon foreseeability 
mld, at 164, 703 P.2d at 4. 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664. 
""/dL at 170, 703 P 2d at 8t 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. 
mld. at 168. 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cai. Rptr. at 667. 
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test. The guideline requires a contemporaneous perception of the injury-
producing event.107 In cases in which the plaintiff gains knowledge of 
the victim's injury well after its occurrence, the courts consistently hold 
the plaintiff has no cause of action for mental distress.108 
When the plaintiff sees the injury immediately after it was inflicted, 
however, the courts are split as to whether the observation is "contem-
poraneous" with the injury-producing event. In Archibald v. Braver-
man,*w a mother heard an explosion and rushed to the scene to find 
her son had suffered traumatic amputation of his hand. The court held 
that her shock was contemporaneous with the explosion, even though 
she did not observe the event.M0 Other cases have stretched either facts 
or reasoning to find that the plaintiffs observation of the injury was 
contemporaneous. In Krouse v. Grahm"x the plaintiff was sitting in his 
car when the defendant struck both the car and the plaintiffs wife. 
The plaintiff did not sec the impact. The court held that the husband 
did "contemporaneously observe" the incident because he was a per-
cipient witness to the impact, knew his wife's position beforehand, saw 
the defendant approaching, and must have realized the car struck her.112 
The court apparently used "constructive knowledge" to find a "con-
temporaneous" observation of the event. 
In Nazaroff v. Superior Court J" the court stretched the facts to 
find a contemporaneous observation of the injury-producing event. In 
Nazaroff, a child drowned in a swimming pool. His mother, alerted by 
a neighbor's cry, arrived on the scene in time to see the boy's body 
pulled from the pool. The court held that the mother had contempor-
aneously observed the drowning because drowning is not an instantaneous 
event, but a continuous process of reduction of blood-gas levels."4 
In contrast, other California courts have interpreted the contem-
poraneous requirement strictly. In Parsons v. Superior Court,ui the 
plaintiffs were following their daughters in a car when the defendant 
driver of the daughters' car rounded a curve and crashed. The parents 
did not see the accident, but arrived on the scene "before the dust had 
•
m0///o/?, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
imSee, e.g., Madigan v. City of Santa Ana, 145 Cal. App. 3d 607, 193 Cal. Rptr. 
593 (1983) (parents did not have a cause of action for mental distress because they did 
not arrive at the scene of their son's auto accident until 15 minutes after its occurrence). 
'"•275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). 
%wld. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
'"19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). 
nild. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
M,80 Cal. App. 3d 553. 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978). 
"
4!d. at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664. 
•"81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978). 
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settled.'* The court held the plaintiffs did not have a contemporaneous 
observation of the injury-producing event and dismissed the suit.1'6 
Similarly, in Hathaway v. Superior Court,117 a child was electrocuted 
on an outdoor cooler. The parents, who were indoors, were alerted by 
the child's friends. They ran outside to find their son lying in a pool 
of water, gagging and spitting. The child did not die until later. Evidence 
introduced at trial suggested that electrocution is not an instantaneous 
event, but a process that may require time. Despite this evidence, the 
court held that the parents did not contemporaneously observe the event 
because the child was no longer touching the cooling unit when they 
arrived.,l8 This strict interpretation of "contemporaneous observation" 
directly contradicts the holdings of Archibald and Nazaroff. 
The second area of conflict in the application of the Dillon test is 
the definition of sensory perception. Perception of the event, other than 
by sight, has been difficult to define consistently. For example, a mother 
who witnesses the defendant's act and her child's injury has been held 
to perceive the event although she was unaware of the negligence at 
that time.119 Yet, if the plaintiff directly perceives the negligence and 
not the injury, he has not sensorily perceived the injury-producing event.120 
Furthermore, courts have included the sense of touch as a sensory 
perception of the event. A mother in labor who felt her contractions 
cease and her baby nod its head was held to have a sensory perception 
of the death of the fetus.121 It is difficult to imagine that this was 
actually a sensory perception of death. It is unlikely the mother actually 
gained direct knowledge at that moment that the fetus was injured. 
Thus, it appears that the court has stretched the concept of sensory 
perception to include perception of an event that does not include 
contemporaneous knowledge of the injury. Therefore, the definition of 
sensory perception needs to be clarified. 
The third area of conflict developed in the reasoning of the "direct 
victim" approach used in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.172 In 
that case, the defendant-doctor negligently misdiagnosed the plaintiffs 
wife as having syphilis. The doctor advised the wife to have her husband 
undergo treatment. The stress and suspicion of sexual infidelity caused 
the marriage to dissolve. The court held that the plaintiff-husband was 
"•/</. ac 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
•"112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980). 
"*/</. at 736. 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440. 
»"S« Mobaldi v. Board of Regents. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573. 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976). 
•^Justus v. Atchison. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122. 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). 
'"Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1007, J77 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65 
(1981). 
,2227 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). 
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a direct victim of the defendant's negligent act.123 The court stated that 
the Molien facts were distinguishable from the Dillon scenario.124 Under 
Molien, the plaintiff has a cause of action without proof of physical 
injury resulting from his distress.123 The court noted that the physical 
injury requirement is an arbitrary and artificial limit on recovery.126 The 
physical injury requirement allows recovery when distress is trivial and 
denies it in cases where recovery is deserved.127 
Shortly thereafter, another case embellished the direct victim theory. 
In Andalon v. Superior Court,12* parents sued for the wrongful birth 
of a child with Down's syndrome. The court stated that the parents 
had a cause of action under the direct victim theory even though they 
had not witnessed the gene mutation considered to be the "injury-
producing event.",29 Thus, under a direct victim analysis, plaintiffs need 
not prove sensory perception of the injury-producing event. 
The lack of both a physical injury requirement and a sensory per-
ception requirement conflicts with cases following Dillon. Yet there 
appears to be little rational basis for the different standard used under 
the Molien analysis. A "direct victim" is not more likely to have suffered 
mental distress than a bystander in a Dillon situation. Therefore, there 
is no reason to require physical injury or contemporaneous awareness 
under the Dillon approach and not under the Molien approach. If the 
likelihood of distress experienced by the direct victim is equal to that 
of the Dillon bystander, then the bystander should be allowed to recover, 
despite the lack of physical injury or contemporaneous sensory perception. 
C. Ochoa's Effect on Prior Case Law 
Ochoa presented an ideal opportunity to clarify and redefine these 
three inconsistencies in the case law of mental distress. Instead, the 
California Supreme Court sidestepped the issues. 
The Ochoa court ignored the "contemporaneous" issue by holding 
that an observation of the defendant's conduct and of the child's injury 
and a contemporaneous awareness of the cause of the injury were 
sufficient.130 The court did not address whether the observation of the 
act and the injury must be contemporaneous or what "contemporaneous" 
means. The court merely required that the plaintiff have a contempor-
™ld. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
"Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
'*/</. 
"Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
,=w162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984). 
,2V</. at 605, 208 Cal. Rptr at 901. 
""39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. 
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aneous knowledge of the source of the injury. The court did not clarify 
whether the plaintiff must know of the source of the injury at the time 
the injury is being inflicted. In Ochoa, the negligent conduct was allowing 
the victim's pneumonia to continue untreated. It is unlikely that the 
mother became aware that the defendant's failure to treat the child was 
the source of the child's injury while she observed his suffering. It is 
more likely that she recognized the cause of the injury subsequent to 
her realization of an injury. The court's requirement of a "contem-
poraneous awareness" of the cause of the injury is, therefore, unclear. 
The Ochoa court also avoided defining "sensory perception of the 
injury-producing event." In Ochoa, the injury-producing event was the 
negligence of the doctor. It is unclear whether the plaintiff-parents 
actually witnessed his negligence. The doctor's negligence was his failure 
to treat his patient. It is unlikely that the mother actually witnessed this 
non-treatment. It is more likely that she became aware of it through 
her observations that the child did not become well. It may be argued 
that this is a sensory observation of only the injury and not the event. 
Thus, this case does not clarify what is required for sensory perception 
of the injury-producing event. 
Finally, Ochoa deals directly with the third area of conflict — the 
inconsistencies between Dillon and Molien. Ochoa held that the plaintiffs 
did not have a cause of action under the Molien direct victim analysis, 
as the negligence of the doctor was directed at the boy, not the parents.'3I 
If the doctor's negligence was a lack of attention, then certainly he 
ignored the mother's attempt to get medical attention. If he ignored the 
son, he ignored the mother. Furthermore, the court overlooked the 
inconsistencies between the two approaches. The differences between 
Molien and Dillon regarding the physical injury and sensory perception 
requirements remain unresolved. 
D. The Ochoa Decision: Consistency or Conflict 
In addition to leaving conflicting case precedent unresolved, the 
Ochoa decision is internally inconsistent. One of the greatest concerns 
with the Dillon standards was that they are sometimes used arbitrarily, 
creating confusion and artificiality.132 The Ochoa majority, after voicing 
this concern, appears to use these guidelines in exactly this manner. The 
court allowed the father to recover only for his distress from observing 
his son, and not for his distress from hearing his wife's reports.133 The 
distress the father suffered from his wife's reports was no less real or 
mltL at 172-73, 703 P.2d at 10, 216 CaJ. Rptr. at 670. 
%KSee id. at 182, 703 P.2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting)* 
"VdL at 165 n.6, 703 P.2d at 5 n.6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.6. 
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foreseeable than the distress he suffered from witnessing the child*! 
condition himself. Thus, the court made an artificial distinction basec 
on the source of the mental distress. This distinction was based upor 
the Dillon requirement that the shock be from a direct emotional impaci 
caused by a sensory and contemporaneous observation. However, th( 
court used the guideline in an artificial manner — not to limit the 
defendant's liability where it is not warranted, but rather to distinguish 
between compensable and non-compensable portions of the same injury 
Another question that arises is the court's use of "serious" mental 
distress. The majority stated that it would compensate the parents onl) 
for their distress resulting from the suffering they witnessed and not foi 
the death of their child, which they did not observe.134 If the child had 
not died, the Ochoas' distress probably would not have been senom 
enough to warrant recovery. A relative of a person who recovers despite 
medical inattention for two days would probably not suffer "serious 
mental distress."133 Therefore, in reality, the court did one of two things. 
It either discarded the seriousness requirement of mental distress or il 
compensated the plaintiffs for their son's death. Actually, the court 
probably allowed recovery for distress suffered from the victim's unob-
served death. This result directly conflicts with the Dillon requirement 
that observation is the basis for recovery and contradicts the court's 
reasoning for not allowing the father a full recovery. 
E. The Ochoa Case as Precedent 
Ochoa will have substantial and far-reaching effects as precedent 
for mental distress cases. First, Ochoa poses serious problems of ap-
plication for future mental distress cases in Dillon jurisdictions. Second, 
Ochoa will deepen the division of opinion as to which is the most 
rational approach to mental distress claims. 
Ochoa's immediate effects within Dillon jurisdictions will be two-
fold. First and most obviously, the case furthers the confusion and 
conflict in the case precedent. Thus, mental distress cases are likely to 
remain in a state of conflict for the present. 
More importantly, Ochoa may have serious repercussions in the area 
of medical malpractice. Ochoa allowed recovery for mental distress caused 
by witnessing a loved one suffer from a doctor's negligence. Therefore, 
tuSee id. at 167 n.7, 703 P.2d at 6 n.7, 216 CaJ. Rptr. at 666 n.7. 
"The courts have repeatedly emphasized that a "serious" mental disturbance requires 
more than being upset or having hurt feelings. A senous injury is one that is debilitatuig. 
Seet e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983). It * 
reasonable to assume that a "reasonable person normally constituted" would be able to 
endure some anxiety over a relative's bnef suy in the hospital, without suffenng debilitatuig 
mental injuries. 
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a claim for a bystander's mental distress for medical malpractice against 
another is now recognized. The addition of another cause of action in 
the medical malpraaice area will increase the scope of damages that 
may be recovered. Considering the problems that large recoveries against 
the medical profession have raised, increasing the scope of damages may 
have negative consequences.136 
Furthermore, Ochoa will strengthen the arguments of those opposed 
to the Dillon approach. Dillon critics fear the possibility of unlimited 
liability for mental distress.137 Adding medical malpractice to the scope 
of mental distress recovery is a large step in the extension of liability. 
Critics may fear that once this step has been taken, there will be no 
principled basis on which to limit liability.138 
Ochoa may also be used to further the argument that the Dillon 
standards are too mechanical.139 Other courts are unlikely to adopt the 
Dillon approach unless it can be proven that its rules of liability are 
sufficiently generalizable to be applied with reasonable certainty to com-
parable factual situations.'40 Ochoa illustrates that such reasonable cer-
tainty of application has not been achieved. Therefore, Ochoa may serve 
as ammunition for jurisdictions that decline to adopt the Dillon fore-
seeability test. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A FLEXIBLE STANDARD 
OF DUTY AND HIGHER BURDEN OF PROOF 
Obviously, none of the alternatives to the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is without fault. A rational approach to the problem 
would be to consider the most important objectives to be attained and 
tailor the solution to meet those objectives. 
Most, if not all, of the arguments proposed in favor of the various 
theories support one of two overriding policies. The first is that any 
'"Increasing medical malpraaice awards will raise the already skyrocketing costs of 
medical malpraaice insurance. Such costs are passed on to consumers, who pay higher 
medical bills. Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury 34 (Rand Corp. Doc. No. R 2881-1CJ, 
1982). In some areas of practice, the high cost of insurance or its unavailability has caused 
a scarcity of doctors. Id. 
•"Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 660-61, 406 A.2d 300, 309 (1979) (Grimes, J., 
dissenting) ("Accidents are often caused not by reprehensible conduct, but by momentary 
inadvertence or judgment which after the faa is found to have been faulty . . . . [TJhe 
court's new rule can cause the dominoes to start falling subjecting the person to suits 
. . . by all manner of relatives whose 'mental tranquility' is claimed to have been upset 
. . . . (TJhe genie is now clearly out of the bottle . . . .") 
,mEg.p id. 
l
»See, e.g., Ochoa. 39 Cat. 3d at 182, 703 P 2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Bird, 
C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
"See D'Ambra v. United States. 114 R.I. 643, 664. 338 A.2d 524, 536 (1975) (Josiin, 
/. . dissenting). 
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rule imposing liability must not be arbitrary or capricious, yet must be 
flexible and broad enough to be applied to various factual situations 
with reasonable certainty.'4' The second goal is an equitable method of 
avoiding unwarranted liability without unduly restricting recovery where 
deserved.142 
A flexible standard of liability, coupled with an increased burden 
of proof, would be the most effective approach to the negligent infliction 
of mental distress. By leaving the substantive law flexible to meet un-
predictable factual situations and increasing the burden of proof to 
eliminate unwarranted liability, most of the criticisms to the various 
approaches to mental distress can be overcome. 
Flexible liability standards require flexible duty standards because 
duty is the key to liability in negligence actions.143 A flexible standard 
of duty is one that is based upon foreseeabilityJ44 Foreseeability as the 
basis of duty would allow flexibility of recovery without the use of 
mechanistic or rigid rules.'45 Foreseeability can be a general principle 
applicable to a variety of factual situations.146 
In order to avoid problems with the interpretation of what must be 
foreseeable, the Dillon standards may be generalized on a simple level. 
The Dillon guidelines require that the plaintiff be a close friend or 
relative who was near the scene of the accident and who witnessed the 
accident.147 These guidelines may be generalized to the concept that the 
plaintiff and the mental injury be foreseeable. The plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant could reasonably expect this injury to occur to this 
person, given the circumstances of the case. In other words, liability 
should be imposed if the defendant could reasonably foresee this type 
of liability as a result of his actions. 
This approach to liability has many positive aspects. The concept 
of duty in mental distress cases will conform to other areas of negli-
gence.148 A flexible approach to duty avoids the criticisms that plague 
the impact rule and zone of danger rule because the foreseeability 
approach is a general principle that avoids mechanistic rules. Liability 
should be imposed if the plaintiff and his injury were foreseeable. 
The greatest disadvantage of a flexible standard of duty is the fear 
of unlimited liability, fraud, and lack of proof of injury and causation. 
"'See, e.g., Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980); D'Ambra, 114 R.I. 
at 664, 338 A.2d at 536 (Joslin, J., dissenting). 
"
:See, e.g., Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728. 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72. 
'"See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54 at 356. 
'"See supra note 66 and accompanying lext. 
'"See Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 191, 703 P.2d at 23. 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J.. 
concurring and dissenting). 
"Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
"See Leong v. Takasaku 55 Hawaii 398. 407, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (1974). 
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AH three of these concerns may be eliminated by raising the burden of 
proof to that of "clear and convincing evidence." 
In a civil trial, the normal burden of proof is a preponderance of 
the evidence.149 This standard serves three functions. First, the low burden 
allows dispute resolution with reasonable dispatch and finality.150 Second, 
there is no substantial reason to burden one party greatly.151 Finally, 
the burden of proof deters frivolous actions only in cases where the 
evidence is in equipoise.152 
Raising the burden of proof to that of "clear and convincing 
evidence"153 would dispose of any criticisms of a flexible-duty approach 
and promote the goal of limiting unwarranted liability. Furthermore, an 
increased burden of proof in mental distress claims would be consistent 
with the rationales for imposing a lower burden in most civil cases. 
Finally, an increase in the burden of proof would be consistent with 
case law where the state of mind is the factual issue to be proven.154 
A standard of clear and convincing evidence should erase most of 
the criticisms surrounding the flexible duty approach. To dispel the fear 
of unsubstantiated claims of mental distress, this burden would force 
the plaintiff to bring forth substantial evidence that he had, in fact, 
been seriously injured and that such injury was caused, in fact, by the 
defendant's negligent conduct.155 A higher burden of proof would allow 
recovery in those cases where it is most deserved and inhibit litigation 
of claims that are less well-founded. 
An increased burden would also tend to deter frivolous mental distress 
claims. For example, a plaintiff who witnessed the traumatic death of 
a loved one would probably be able to convince the jury that he had, 
in fact, suffered injury, given an appropriate amount of medical evidence. 
A plaintiff who suffered a mental injury because of property damage, 
however, would not be able to meet the burden so easily. Such a plaintiff 
would find the jury more skeptical of his claim. Furthermore, this plaintiff 
would have a great deal more trouble producing the required quantum 
of medical evidence. The plaintiff who indeed suffered a devastating 
-MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed. E.W. Cleary 1972). 
"•Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Non Persuasion, 5 LAW & Soc. REV. 335, 336 
(1975). 
ml<L at 337. 
"The standard of clear and convincing evidence has been defined as "that measure 
or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fart a firm belief or 
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." This is an intermediate 
standard, falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and 
the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 
569, 570 (Tex. 1979). 
mSee infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
'"A lack of proof regarding both injury and causation was a rationale supporting 
the impact rule. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
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injury from an unusual source, however, would not be automatically 
precluded from asserting his claim. He would still have an opportunity 
to put forth evidence that the injury did occur and to let the jury weigh 
the evidence in view of the burden he must carry. 
Increasing the burden of proof would also be consistent with the 
rationales for maintaining a lower burden in most civil cases. An increase 
in the burden will not materially slow the litigation process.156 The change 
would only force the plaintiff to produce a greater quantum of convincing 
evidence.137 
However, the most important reason for increasing the burden of 
proof in mental distress cases is that mental injury is peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the plaintiff. This fact puts the defendant at a sub-
stantial evidentiary disadvantage. Courts have feared compensating for 
mental distress because of the potential for fraudulent claims.158 The 
burden of proof is often raised when there is a special danger of 
deception.139 Therefore, there is a substantial reason for burdening one 
party more than the other. 
Finally, there is a real need to deter frivolous actions in cases where 
the evidence appears on the surface to be just beyond equipoise.160 The 
potential for fraud and deception in mental distress cases is an ever-
present factor.,61 Therefore, all but the most convincing cases of mental 
distress should be deterred. 
A standard of clear and convincing evidence in mental distress cases 
would conform to the burden of proof used in many civil cases where 
the issue to be proved is one's state of mind. For example, malice must 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.162 More importantly, mental 
illness must usually be proved by clear and convincing evidence.163 While 
this issue normally arises in litigation surrounding commitment pro-
ceedings, the rationale applies as well to claims of mental distress. If 
the issue to be proven is objective, the burden of a preponderance of 
the evidence may be used. If such a determination is subjective, however, 
a standard of clear and convincing evidence must be met.164 Because 
mental illness is not objective, it stands to reason that it should be subject 
**See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
"Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570. 
»*£.$., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (1978). 
'"See MCCORMICK, supra note 149, at § 340. 
""See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
-See Towns, 195 Colo, at 519, 579 P.2d at 1164. 
I W£*., DiLeo v. Koltnow, 200 Colo. 119, 613 P.2d 318 (1980). 
,w£.*. f In re Johnston, 118 111. App. 3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840 (1983); Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 60 Or. App. 623, 654 P.2d 1121 (1982). 
'-See, e.g., Maine Human Rights ComnVn v. City of Auburn, 425 A.2d 990, 997 
(Me. 1981) (question of intentional sex discrimination in hiring practices). 
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to a higher burden of proof. Therefore, an increased burden of proof 
for mental distress cases would be both appropriate and in accordance 
with analogous case law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the modern trend of legal thought favors more expansive 
approaches to liability for mental distress, many problems with the Dillon 
and pure foreseeability tests are still unresolved. Ochoa is a prime example 
of the conflict and confusion that have evolved from the application 
of Dillon to factually dissimilar situations. The Ochoa court ignored the 
conflicts in prior case law and concentrated on one specific factual 
scenario. It left a host of unanswered questions about the application 
of the Dillon guidelines and the future viability of the Dillon mental 
distress theory. 
By combining a general foreseeability test for duty with a burden 
of proof of "clear and convincing" evidence, the two goals of flexibility 
and limiting unwarranted liability may be attained. Such an approach 
will overcome many of the criticisms of the more expansive approaches 
and avoid the problems associated with an Ochoa situation. 
NANA QUAY-SMITH 
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Decedent's Heirs Under the Utah 
Wrongful Death Act 
The Utah Wrongful Death Act1 was intended to provide just 
compensation to that class of persons most likely to be injured by 
the wrongful act or neglect of another that causes the death of the 
decedent.3 The legislature, in this regard, has statutorily granted on 
behalf of the decedent's heirs a cause of action against the wrong-
doer.1 The legislature, however, by granting the decedent's heirs a 
cause of action without defining the scope of that term, has bur-
dened the courts with the duty to define it judicially. Although the 
Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to apply the Wrong-
ful Death Act, it has never specifically defined how broadly or nar-
rowly heirs is to be construed. 
The first part of this Note, in an effort to determine the scope 
of protection provided in the Wrongful Death Act, focuses on the 
statutory sources for a definition of heirs based on the remedial 
policy of the Act, the applicable portions of the Probate Code defini-
tion of heirs, and the equities involved. Next, the possibility of 
expanding the definition of heirs beyond the Probate Code's statu-
tory definition to accommodate the constitutional requirement of 
aqual protection and the judicial doctrine of equitable adoption is 
explored. Finally, the Note suggests possible statutory expansions 
of protection either by legislative amendment or by judicial recogni-
tion of a common law right to recover for wrongful death. 
U UTAH CODE ANN. 3§ 78-11-6, -7 (1977). The Utah Wrongful Death Act is in two 
Mttrana: $ 6 deals with the wrongful death of a minor child, § 7 covers other wrongful death 
trtiooa. 
2. The Wrongful Death Act attempts to compensate the heirs for their own loss, not to 
ctunptoiats for the injury caused to the deceased. See Mason v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Utah 77, 
81, 24 P. 796, 797 (1890). Any cause of action the decedent himself might have had against 
tbs tortfeasor also survives to his heirs under UTAH CODS ANN. § 784142 (1977). 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-7 (1977) states: 
Except as provided in chapter 1, of Title 35 [Workmen's Compensation Act), when 
U» death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, 
hu hem, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an 
action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such person is employed 
by aaothsr person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other 
pt«oD. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his death, only one action 
csa be maintained for the injury to or death of such person, and such action may be 
bfoofhi by either the personal representatives of such adult deceased person, for the 
****fit of hit heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided in the 
owl preceding section J78-11-6], In every action under this and the next preceding 
*ctjon (78-11-6] such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
*** aty bt jut*, (emphasis added) 
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